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Making Sense of the Experiences of Bar 
Applicants with Criminal Records 
H A D A R  A V I R A M *  
I. INTRODUCTION 
n September 2017, Reginald Dwayne Betts, a graduate of Yale Law 
School, was admitted to the Connecticut Bar. This achievement for 
Betts was unsurprising given his career highlights: He graduated from 
the University of Maryland, won a Harvard University fellowship, wrote two 
poetry books and a memoir, and has been working on his law doctorate at 
Yale with an eye toward a legal academic career. But Betts’ path also includes 
three felony convictions related to a carjacking he had committed at a 
Virginia mall when he was 16 years old, two decades before he became a 
Connecticut attorney, for which he served eight years in prison.1 
In February 2019, the Yale Law Journal Forum published an opinion 
piece by attorney Tarra Simmons,2 in which she urges reform of the moral 
character requirements of the Washington State Bar. Simmons speaks from 
experience: Her formative experiences in the criminal justice system, shaped 
 
*  Thomas E. Miller ’73 Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law. I am grateful to the participants of my seminar Criminalization and Social 
Control, as well as to Sarah Fielding and Jesse Stout, for their comments. I am also 
grateful to the anonymous reviewers of the Manitoba Law Review for their helpful 
suggestions. 
1  Dave Collins, “Felon who Graduated from Yale Allowed to Become Lawyer” (29 
September 2017), online: Boston Globe <www.boston.com/news/local-news/2017/09/ 
29/felon-who-graduated-from-yale-allowed-to-become-lawyer> [perma.cc/A2Z5-HE52]. 
2  Tarra Simmons, “Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform 









by trauma, addiction, and poverty, shaped her feelings of alienation and 
exclusion in law school and before the Washington State bar. 
And, in September 2019, the American Lawyer published a story 
criticizing “the archaic Bar Character and Fitness Exam.”3 The article 
quoted Prof. Shon Hopwood of Georgetown Law School, an authority on 
criminal justice and civil rights, whose journey to legal academia and 
practice started in federal prison, where he spent 12 years for an armed 
robbery. 
Barriers of the sort faced by Betts, Simmons, Hopwood, and others 
receive little attention in the standard literature on reentry and 
reintegration. This literature, with good reason, tends to focus on the very 
basic barriers faced by people with criminal records and a history of 
incarceration: procuring food, shelter, and minimum-wage employment. 
Addressing re-entry problems related to the very base of Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs is understandable and justifiable: as Stephen Raphael explains in 
The New Scarlet Letter, people with criminal histories face formidable odds, 
and a tough uphill battle, in the effort to secure employment.4 Raphael and 
others express concerns about the paucity of evidence-based, efficient 
vocational programming in prison,5 the absence of a good continuum after 
incarceration,6 and the impact of stigma7 and disenfranchisement from civic 
and political life.8 Underscoring these challenges are vast economic 
inequalities and the debilitating poverty of formerly incarcerated people. In 
2011, Alessandro de Giorgi conducted extensive fieldwork among formerly 
incarcerated people making their first steps on the outside.9 Expecting to 
 
3  The Young Lawyer Editorial Board, “The Archaic Bar Character and Fitness Exam Must 
Be Reformed” (10 September 2019), online: American Lawyer, <www.law.com/am 
ericanlawyer/2019/09/10/the-archaic-bar-character-and-fitness-exam-needs-to-be-ref/> 
[perma.cc/K6D4-LBFP]. 
4  Steven Raphael, The New Scarlet Letter?: Negotiating the U.S. Labor Market with a Criminal 
Conviction (New York: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2014). 
5  Christy A Visher, “Effective Reentry Programs” (2006) 5 Criminology & Public Policy 
299. 
6  Jeremy Travis, “But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry” (2001) 5:3 
Corrections Management Q 23. 
7  Christopher Uggen et al, “The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects 
of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment” (2014) 52:4 Criminology 627. 
8  Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American 
Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
9  Alessandro de Giorgi, “Back to Nothing: Prisoner Reentry and Neoliberal Neglect” 
(2017) 44:1 Soc Justice 83. 
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find and document the “significant expansion of the penal state,” de Giorgi 
was surprised to find mostly “chronic poverty and the daily struggle for 
survival in a neoliberal city… the daily struggles of stigmatized people 
scrambling to disentangle themselves from the treacherous grips of chronic 
poverty, sudden homelessness, untreated physical and mental suffering, and 
the lack of meaningful social services.”10  
While problems of basic survival are understandably acute, and 
therefore deserving of a central place in socio-legal scholarship, it is also 
important to learn how criminal histories operate in professional realms in 
which they are perceived as more unusual and aberrant. Accordingly, this 
paper seeks to expand the framework of re-entry and desistance to discuss 
admission barriers to an elite, selective profession — the legal profession. It 
seeks to understand, and systematize, the experiences of people with 
criminal records who apply for admission to the Bar; how they make sense 
of their past and their present; how they experience the moral character 
determination process; and how their histories and the moral character 
process shapes their professional paths and aspirations. The project 
corresponds with bodies of literature about prisoner re-entry, life-course 
criminology and desistance, sociology of the professions, and socio-
psychological writings about remorse, stigma, and redemption of spoiled 
identities. 
Life-course criminologists identify education and employment as 
important “turning points” away from crime, whether due to control 
theories involving motivation11 or due to these frameworks creating distance 
from criminal peers.12 Moreover, research has found that experiencing 
multiple life events facilitates desistance more than experiencing one– also 
known as experiencing the “respectability package.”13 In that respect, 
 
10  Ibid at 88–89. 
11  John H Laub & Robert J Sampson, “Turning Points in the Life Course: Why Change 
Matters to the Study of Crime” (1993) 31:3 Criminology 301; Walter Forrest & Carter 
Hay, “Life-Course Transitions, Self-Control and Desistance from Crime” (2011) 11:5 
Criminology & Crim Justice 487. 
12  Mark Warr, “Life Course Transitions and Desistance from Crime” (1998) 36:2 
Criminology 183. 
13  Elaine Eggleston Doherty & Jaclyn Cwick, “Unpacking the Complexity of Life Events 
and Desistance: An Application of Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations to 
Developmental and Life Course Criminology” (2016) 2:1 J Developmental & Life 
Course Criminology 45. 




undertaking professional education that leads to an elite profession can be 
perceived as a cluster of “turning points” rather than a single event.  
Other scholarship about desistance, particularly Shadd Maruna’s 
Making Good, highlights the importance of constructing a coherent narrative 
of transformation for desistance.14 The capacity to tell such a story is 
sometimes honed by prison programming and sometimes, for better or 
worse, by the need to present a story of insight and remorse to a parole 
board.15 Some studies have found inverse statistical correlations between 
feeling remorse, shame, and guilt, and recidivating; however, research 
design and the difficulty of operationalizing emotions make these studies 
difficult to generalize from.16 Moreover, it is important to distinguish 
between feeling such emotions and expressing them. As Erving Goffman 
reminds us, situations in which people have to disavow past behavior (and 
fight against the stigma involving spoiled identity) are performative, in that 
the way in which we express insight, remorse, and transformation takes into 
account the audience.17  
The need to perform and exhibit good moral character as the price of 
admission is not unique to the bar. As Deborah Rhode explains, the idea of 
moral character is important to American law, and plays an important role 
in organizing professional capacity, despite ample psychological evidence 
that character is shaped through a situational lens, rather than as an 
independent monolith.18 
This article examines these deep questions through the lens of the 
experiences of bar takers themselves. Part I provides a legal analysis of the 
 
14  Shadd Maruna, Making Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives (New York: 
American Psychological Association, 2001). 
15  For more on the performative aspect of portraying contrition, remorse, and “insight” 
on parole, see Hadar Aviram, Yesterday’s Monsters: The Manson Family Cases and the 
Illusion of Parole (Oakland: UC Press, 2020); Victor L Shammas, “The Perils of Parole 
Hearings: California Lifers, Performative Disadvantage, and the Ideology of Insight” 
(2019) 42:1 PoLAR 142. 
16  June Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig & Logaina Hafez, “Shame, Guilt and Remorse: 
Implications for Offender Populations” (2011) 22:5 J Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 
706. 
17  Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New York: 
Touchstone, 2009). 
18  Deborah Rhode, “Moral Character as a Professional Credential” (1986) 94 Yale LJ 491; 
Deborah L Rhode, “Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral Character Requirement in 
Occupational Licensing, Bar Regulation, and Immigration Proceedings” (2018) 43:3 
Law & Soc Inquiry 1027. 
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5 
California Bar’s determination of moral character, relying on the Bar rules. 
Part II offers an empirical examination of the Bar’s policy through the eyes 
of ten California Bar applicants with criminal records, two ethics lawyers, 
and a Bar official. Part III draws on the legal and empirical analysis to discuss 
the significance of shame, remorse, and diversity to the experience of Bar 
applicants. The conclusion section makes some recommendations for law 
schools and the Bar for making the process more inclusive. 
II.  THE CALIFORNIA BAR AND MORAL CHARACTER  
DETERMINATION 
In both the U.S. and Canada, some moral fitness scrutiny is an essential 
part of the licensing process of lawyers. In the Canadian process, which 
varies by province, character fitness review is conducted by the bar and also 
attested to by the lawyer with whom the applicant is articling.19 In the U.S. 
process the moral character application is one of three hurdles that 
successful applicants must clear; the other two are the Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE), a three-hour, multiple-
choice exam developed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners and 
administered nationally in the same format, and the passage of the state’s 
Bar examination. The California Bar Examination, recently shortened from 
three to two days, encompasses the 200-question Multistate Bar 
Examination (MBE), essays, and a “performance test” (performing a lawyerly 
duty in a hypothetical case). 
Title 4 of the Rules of the California State Bar defines “good moral 
character” as including, but “not limited to qualities of honesty, fairness, 
candor, trustworthiness, observance of fiduciary responsibility, respect for 
and obedience to the law, and respect for the rights of others and the 
judicial process.”20 The burden of proof of moral character is on the 
applicant. All bar applicants submit a written moral character application 
 
19  See generally Alice Woolley, “Can Good Character Be Made Better? Assessing the 
Federation of Law Societies’ Proposed Reform of the Good Character Requirement for 
Law Society Admission” (2013) 26:2 Can J Admin L & Prac 115. For an example of 
the provincial process, see “Good Character Requirement” (last visited 20 April 2020), 
online: Law Society of Ontario <lso.ca/becoming-licensed/lawyer-licensing-process/good-
character-requirement> [perma.cc/73JD-HTJ8]. 
20  The State Bar of California, Rules of the State Bar, San Francisco: State Bar of California, 
2007, Rule 4.40 [State Bar of California, Rules]. 




online and provide their fingerprints for a background check.21 The bar 
website advises applicants that “[i]t’s important to be honest on the 
application. The Committee of Bar Examiners considers candor to be a 
significant factor in determining whether an applicant has the good moral 
character required for admission to practice law.”22 The obligation to 
disclose relevant information continues even after submitting an 
application.23  
Until Fall 2018, the Bar did not compile statistics for their moral 
character processing, but its officials estimate that about 50% of 
applications proceed through without a problem within the 180-day limit 
established by the Rules.24 For the remaining 50%, the Moral Character 
Committee examines the applicant’s history and classifies it into one of four 
categories, according to the severity and recency of the incidents.25 Category 
1 encompasses juvenile misdemeanors, vehicle code infractions, 
uncomplicated bankruptcy history, and academic probation. Category 2 
includes misdemeanors, job terminations, minor college infractions, 
failures to appear, and dismissed complaints against the applicant in an 
attorney capacity. Category 3 entails driving under the influence of 
intoxicants (DUI), military discipline proceedings (or other professional 
discipline incidents) involving moral turpitude, accusations of fraud, and 
serious discipline issues incurred in college. The most serious issues are 
included in Category 4: felony convictions, drug sales, two or more DUIs 
within five years, and violations of the law school honor code.  
The first step for an application triggering further action is a letter to 
the applicant, asking for clarification or elaboration on the incidents in the 
report. The letter sometimes also highlights inconsistencies in the 
application, discrepancies between the applicant’s record and the 
application, and differences between the applicant’s original law school 
application and the moral character application. Within 120 days of 
receiving the applicant’s additional information, the Committee responds 
in one of five ways: clearing the application, stating that the applicant did 
not meet the moral character burden, noting that “the application requires 
 
21  Ibid, Rule 4.41. 
22  “Moral Character” (last visited 20 April 2020), online: State Bar of California <www.calb 
ar.ca.gov/Admissions/Moral-Character> [perma.cc/QM52-SDX6]. 
23 State Bar of California, Rules, supra note 20, Rule 4.41. 
24 Ibid, Rule 4.45. 
25  Interview of Mark Torres-Gil (Fall 2018) (on file with author); Mark Torres-Gil, “Moral 
Character” PowerPoint presentation: (on file with author).  
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further consideration”, inviting the applicant to an “informal conference”, 
or advising the applicant to enter into an Agreement of Abeyance with the 
Committee (typically in cases in which criminal charges are pending against 
the candidate, and the matter should therefore be resumed only after their 
completion).26 
The “informal conference” is, in essence, an interview with members of 
the committee (the number of interviewers reported by my interviewees 
ranged between four and seven). Participation in the interview is voluntary 
(and, technically, scheduled in response to the applicant’s “request”27), but 
virtually all applicants who are invited to it attend. The candidate can be 
represented by an attorney, but the attorney’s role is “limited to 
observation” and he or she “may not participate” at the hearing.   
The hearing is, typically, the conclusive stage of the moral character 
determination; after the hearing, the applicant receives a letter notifying 
him or her of the outcome. Following an adverse determination, the 
applicant may “file a request for hearing on the determination with the State 
Bar Court,”28 but few do; it makes much more sense to save the money on 
representation, since the negative determination is usually in place for two 
years, and after those years the candidate may reapply with new evidence of 
his or her insight, contrition, or rehabilitation. A positive determination is 
in place for 36 months but may be extended at the applicant’s request.29  
Two recent California Supreme Court cases govern the moral character 
discourse: In re Gossage (2000)30 and In re Glass (2014).31 Eben Gossage 
became addicted to drugs in the late 1960s, at age 15, and engaged in 
numerous property offences, including forgeries, to finance his habit.32 He 
went in and out of jail for several years, was rejected by drug rehabilitation 
programs because of his violence, and, at age 23, during a visit to his sister, 
argued with her and killed her.33 He was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter, received an indeterminate sentence (as was common in the 
1970s), and was paroled two and one-half years later.34 Gossage proceeded 
 
26  State Bar of California, Rules, supra note 20, Rule 4.45. 
27  Ibid, Rule 4.46. 
28  Ibid, Rule 4.47 
29  Ibid, Rule 4.51. 
30  In re Gossage, 99 Cal Rptr 2d 130 (2000) [Gossage]. 
31  In re Glass, 58 Cal 4th 500 (2014) [Glass]. 
32  Gossage, supra note 30 at 133. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid at 134. 




to commit various offences until the early 1980s, when he did a stint in state 
prison and, according to him, “hit [rock] bottom” there.35 Upon his release 
he turned his life around, working odd jobs, and in the late 1980s attended 
Golden Gate University Law School, passing the bar on the first try in 
1991.36 Throughout his law school studies, and for several years after his 
graduation, Gossage committed numerous traffic offences — pertaining 
mostly to license offences and vehicle registration violations — which were 
not resolved until the mid-1990s.37 In his moral character application, 
Gossage disclosed only four of his 17 convictions, omitting most of the 
forgeries.38 On appeal from the State Bar Court, which found Gossage’s 
rehabilitation convincing, the California Supreme Court reversed and 
found Gossage unfit to practice law.39 The standard applied placed a “heavy 
burden” on Gossage to prove internal transformation:  
We therefore agree with the Committee that Gossage can be found morally fit to 
practice law only if the evidence shows that he is no longer the same person who 
behaved so poorly in the past, and only if he has since behaved in exemplary 
fashion over a meaningful period of time. This heavy burden is commensurate 
with the gravity of his crimes.40 
In finding that Gossage did not lift this burden, the California Supreme 
Court relied not only on his long and unreported record of traffic offences, 
but also on his flawed disclosure. The decision emphasized that “the 
unusual severity and scope of Gossage's criminal record strengthened - not 
lessened - his obligation to ensure the accuracy of his Application even if 
independent research was required” and, lest this seem an unsurmountable 
task, that “[m]ore rigorous intellectual tasks are often performed by 
attorneys in the practice of law.”41 
Another case in which lack of candor, manifested in imperfect 
cooperation with the Bar, was in re Glass, which involved hapless journalist 
Stephen Glass, who in the late 1990s fabricated material more than 40 
articles for The New Republic and other publications.42 Glass had invented, 
out of whole cloth, sources and interviewees for numerous stories, 
 
35  Ibid at 135 
36  Ibid at 136. 
37  Ibid at 137–38. 
38  Ibid at 139. 
39  Ibid at 149. 
40  Ibid at 144. 
41  Ibid at 148. 
42  Glass, supra note 31 at 504. 
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rendering verisimilitude to his creations by fabricating supporting materials 
and thus eluding the magazine fact checkers.43 Glass was finally exposed and 
fired in 1998, while already a law student at Georgetown University’s 
evening program, and in 2000 he graduated and passed the New York Bar 
examination.44 In Glass’s application to the New York Bar he disclosed only 
20 of his fabrications, and also falsely stated that he had assisted The New 
Republic in uncovering his falsehoods.45 In the early 2000s, Glass wrote a 
book based on his experiences and also letters of apologies to numerous 
people he had harmed through his fabrications.46 He had also undergone 
more than a decade of therapy.47  
Glass passed the California bar exam in 2006 and filed his moral 
character application in 2007. The committee denied his application. The 
California State Bar Court reversed, finding that Glass “had satisfied his 
‘heavy burden of proof’ and established his rehabilitation.”48 But the 
California Supreme Court reversed the State Bar Court decision. 
Undertaking “an independent review of the record, with a focus on Glass’s 
many acts of dishonesty and professional misconduct,”49 the Court 
examined “whether he has established a compelling showing of 
rehabilitation and truly exemplary conduct over an extended period that 
would suffice to demonstrate his fitness for the practice of law.”50 Answering 
this question in the negative, the Court highlighted the extensive and 
systematic pattern of deception, Glass’s violations of journalistic ethics, 
engaging in this dishonest conduct while a law student at Georgetown, and, 
importantly, the gaps in his disclosures to the New York Bar — even though 
his disclosures to the California Bar a decade later were complete (albeit 
characterized by “hypocrisy and evasiveness”).51 Another problem with 
Glass’s record was that “instead of directing his efforts at serving others in 
the community, much of Glass’s energy since the end of his journalistic 
career seems to have been directed at advancing his own career and financial 
 
43  Ibid at 505 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid at 511. 
46  Ibid at 513. 
47  Ibid at 516. 
48  Ibid at 518. 
49  Ibid at 522. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid at 523. 




and emotional well-being.”52 Denying Glass’s right to practice law was part 
of the Court’s “duty to protect the public and maintain the integrity and 
high standards of the profession.”53 
Gossage and Glass are often mentioned, both by Bar officials and by 
ethics attorneys, as essential readings on moral character — and, indeed, they 
offer insights as to the importance of honesty and full disclosure, as well as 
to the principle that the burden on the applicant to show rehabilitation and 
“exemplary conduct” increases with his or her misdeeds of the past. They 
also reveal the Bar’s emphasis to gauge whether the applicant has truly 
transformed himself from the inside as well as contributed to the 
community. Both cases, however, are based on unique and extraordinary 
facts, and therefore present some difficulty in generalization. How is the 
committee process experienced by people with criminal records? How do 
people perceive and comprehend the ways in which they have to perform 
remorse, rehabilitation, and “exemplary conduct”? These questions call for 
empirical examination.  
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF BAR TAKERS  
WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 
A. Methods 
This project seeks to make sense of the experiences of the moral 
character applicants themselves through in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews. The project encompasses 13 interviews, sampled through social 
media appeals to the California community (via Facebook and Twitter and 
using Facebook pages and hashtags to recruit from local bars and law school 
alumni associations). Interviewees approached me after friends or colleagues 
who knew of their personal history informed them of my project. Even 
though, as explained above, character fitness is part and parcel of admission 
to the legal profession in all U.S. states and Canadian provinces, I focused 
the empirical on one jurisdiction in order to rule out distinctions and 
differences stemming from different procedures. While the 13 interviews 
were sufficient to achieve content saturation, it is also important to specify 
that the shame and secrecy surrounding criminal records for bar applicants 
posed considerable difficulty in locating and approaching interview subjects 
 
52  Ibid at 524. 
53  Ibid at 526. 
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in a systematic way. Ten of these are interviews with successful bar 
applicants who went through the moral character process with criminal 
backgrounds ranging from expunged juvenile drug convictions to serious 
violence adult offences that yielded prison terms.54 The interviewees were 
diverse in terms of gender (six men, four women), race (five white, two 
African Americans, three Latino interviewees), and age (ranging from 25 to 
60). I also conducted two interviews with ethics attorneys who assist bar 
applicants with their written moral character application and at the 
“informal conference” and/or subsequent state bar court proceedings. In 
addition, I spoke to the Assistant General Counsel at The State Bar, who is 
also responsible for administering the moral character determinations.  
Interviews ranged from one to two hours and were conducted after 
informed consent was given in accordance with protocols approved by 
WIRB. No remuneration was given to subjects. Half of the interviews were 
recorded (the other half were not, at the interviewees’ requests), and all of 
them were transcribed in shorthand during the interview. Most were 
conducted face to face, though a few (with Southern California lawyers) had 
to be conducted by phone. Notably, several interviewees kept their personal 
history discreet from their colleagues, and therefore these interviews took 
place after work hours or early in the morning, when my interlocutors were 
alone at the office.  
The analysis was conducted inductively, in accordance with modified 
grounded theory principles.55 I reviewed the interview transcripts for 
recurring ideas, concepts or elements, coded the interviews accordingly, and 
then grouped them into concepts and categories. The themes I identified 
resonated with several bodies of literature, and primarily with my work on 
parole hearings.56 Vignettes from the unrecorded, shorthanded interviews 
were lightly edited for readability. Pseudonyms are used throughout the 
piece and unique identifying information has been omitted to protect the 
subjects. 
 
54  One example of the limitations of the sampling methods is that, for understandable 
reasons, I was not approached by people who ultimately did not prevail in their moral 
character process. I was approached by a few law students who were in the process of 
applying but were yet unable to provide me with an account of the entire process, and 
while we had interesting conversations, these were not included in the sample. 
55  Barney G Glaser & Anselm L Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (New York: Routledge, 2017). 
56  Aviram, supra note 15. 




A Note on Positionality: I am a law professor in California and have been 
a member of the California Bar since 2011. I have provided advice and 
written recommendations to dozens of students applying for the Bar; I have 
also testified twice at the State Bar Court in defense of applicants denied 
entry or reentry to the profession. This background puts me in the unique 
position of understanding the importance of some gatekeeping into a 
profession that requires honesty and scrupulous ethics, and at the same time 
empathizing with people whose background dovetails with much of my 
criminal justice scholarship. 
B. Findings 
1. Nothing to Hide Except My Shame: The Written Disclosure Phase 
The California Bar website, as well as law professors and ethics lawyers, 
remind applicants to err on the side of disclosure: “if you are not sure, 
disclose.” The summaries of Gossage and Glass above highlight the 
importance of full disclosure in the determination of moral character, and 
particularly the way omissions can sometimes be perceived at least as 
seriously as the underlying offence. The Bar official I interviewed explained: 
One of the most important things to us is candor. So if we have an incomplete 
application, that tells us something important about the applicant. And the thing 
that is omitted could be a minor thing, but —   
Q: In other words, the coverup is worse than the crime. 
A: (laughs) exactly.  
My interviewees who had sealed or expunged juvenile court records had no 
doubt that they should describe those instances at length and were desperate 
to explain that they were no longer part of their criminal record. Other than 
that, my interviewees’ approach in filling in the forms reminded me of the 
dread stoked by high school principals about our “permanent records”: an 
uncertainty about what their paper persona looked like from the bar side 
and a desire to anticipate and preempt any surprises it might contain.  
Gabe, a public defender with an expunged juvenile record, said: 
I didn’t honestly know much about the difference between “sealed” and 
“expunged” or bother to do anything about any of this, though my parents of 
course did their best to take care of that. But it was crystal clear to me that all of 
these things needed to be reported. 
Raúl said: 
     Experiences of Bar Applicants with Criminal Records 
 
13 
When I started law school, I talked right away with my professors. I remember 
especially talking to my ethics professor. He made it clear that all this stuff has to 
be disclosed. What I kept hearing was “err on the side of disclosure.” 
Raúl’s experience is typical in the sense that law school professors, 
particularly ethics professors, tend to be the institutional gatekeepers for 
moral character information. Most of my interviewees revealed some, or all, 
of their criminal background to one or two trusted professors, who advised 
them on the basis of their experience with similar students over the years. 
Their memories of these professors are invariably warm, in that the 
professors supported them and assured them that they would, eventually, 
be admitted. 
Jolene: I had a really messed-up youth and came to law school as what they call a 
“nontraditional” student.  
Q: Were you open about your background at school? 
A: Sure. I had nothing to hide. I told my professor everything and he did say it was 
going to be an uphill battle, I mean, to pass the bar. 
Q: Did that give you pause about staying in law school? 
A: No. He said it was eventually going to be OK. I figured I’d take law school and 
see what happens. 
Even though the prospect of fighting the moral character battle loomed over 
the interviewees, most of them experienced it as an undercurrent in a sea of 
stress and anxiety.  
Gina: Between moot court and journal and a bunch of student orgs and just 
studying and trying to make good grades, plus having a life, this was one more 
thing I had to do, but I thought it was all going to work out fine and pushed it out 
of my mind.  
Brian: Law school was intense, and there was also intense personal stuff that was 
going on during those years. You can’t go through all of this and ruminate about 
the bar all the time. 
There was considerable variation among the interviewees in terms of when 
the reality of having to deal with the moral character coalesced for them. A 
few of them realized that they might need help as soon as they entered law 
school; for others, this problem became salient only as the bar exam started 
to loom large. Martin, an ethics attorney, said: 
People call throughout law school, but most of the calls I get come in around the 
fall of 3L [the third year of law school – H.A.], which is when people typically 
submit their paperwork. I wish more people called sooner, because there’s a lot of 
damage control we can do during the law school years. 
Q: Such as? 




A: For example, sometimes it is pretty clear that there’s going to be an issue with 
substance abuse. If the student starts attending LAP [the bar program for substance 
abuse rehabilitation – H.A.] in law school, that could save some precious time 
later.  
For some interviewees, the requirement to provide extensive disclosure 
presented problems. Raúl and Gina, in particular, talked about the difficulty 
to provide full and accurate accounts of their juvenile records. 
Raúl: It’s all a blur. Juvie, jail, I honestly couldn’t tell you a clear story about where 
I was at any given moment because my whole juvenile experience is chaos. 
Gina: I was bouncing between juvie and foster homes and group homes for all of 
my teenage years. And the problem was that, for the law school application, which 
I kind of finagled last minute, I didn’t bother to check all the dates and such. For 
the moral character I got lucky. 
Q: How did you do it? 
Gina: Fortunately, I kept extensive, detailed journals when I was a teenager, so I 
went back and consulted those to put the timeline together. But of course, now 
this timeline didn’t match what I had written in the law school application, so I 
get this letter saying to “explain the omissions.” 
The assumption that discrepancies between the application and extraneous 
data, such as the applicant’s law school application or rap sheet, are the 
product of intentional omissions, was deemed by several interviewees 
unrealistic and hurtful. 
Mike: Some stuff honestly escaped my mind, and now I’m getting a letter from the 
bar saying that I should explain the omissions. It’s like I’ve been cheating or lying 
or something. 
Rasheed, whose property conviction did not stand in his way for his New 
York bar membership, nonetheless disclosed it with detail when the time 
came to apply in California, explaining, “Why not? At that point I had 
nothing to hide, except my shame.” Indeed, the act of writing itself dredged 
up considerable amounts of shame for many interviewees.  
Bree: It’s all like a bad dream. You forget, or maybe forget is inaccurate. You put 
it out of your mind, you try to live your life and put the time and expense and bad 
experiences aside, and now you have to relive them all. 
Rasheed: Ironically, it’s the very fact that you’re somewhere else in your life, 
applying for these prestigious jobs, putting your life together, that makes it most 
shameful. Because you’ve gone a distance from your past, and now you have to 
relive the past in writing, go back through all that, the mischaracterizations. 
This deep sense of shame, stemming from a juxtaposition of the 
interviewees’ statuses in the past and presence, is strongly evocative of 
Goffman’s work on spoiled identities and of Everett Hughes’ concept of 
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master statuses. Shifting one’s self identification to that of a prospective 
lawyer, the interviewees invoke the dissonance and dismay involved with 
the need to step back into the shoes of criminal defendants and/or prison 
inmates. 
2. “It was, hands down, the worst experience of my life”: The Informal 
Conference 
For some of my interviewees, the request for additional information was 
not the end of the process: they were invited to the “informal conference.” 
Their preparation for this even varied widely. About a third of them hired 
a lawyer, and those who did were ambivalent, at best, about the services they 
received:  
Gina: That, honestly, was a waste of money. She sort of told me what to write, but 
it’s nothing I couldn’t come up with on my own. So the second time [after a 
negative determination and a two-year wait] I didn’t get a lawyer, I just did it all on 
my own. 
Bree: The lawyer’s help was limited. You know they can sit in the room with you 
but they can’t talk. If anything, it was a boost of support, that there was one person 
in the room that was on my side, but not a lot more than that.  
By contrast, the ethics lawyers themselves feel that their services were 
essential, and that many unrepresented applicants made mistakes. 
Margaret: I sometimes get people in when it’s time for the informal conference, or 
even when they’re thinking of an appeal to the State Bar, and it’s too late. You 
look at their paperwork and you think, if only they had come to talk to me. 
Martin: The most important service we offer people is framing. It’s a delicate 
balance between explaining what happened to you in context and being seen as if 
you’re deflecting blame for what you’ve done. 
These contradictions might reflect the candidates’ excessive confidence in 
their own ability to prepare their paperwork, the lawyers’ inflated sense of 
the value they added to their clients’ petitions, or both; in any case, they 
reflect some anxiety on the part of the candidates to appear in the best 
possible light to the committee.  
The conference itself was uniformly described as an overwhelmingly 
negative experience. Six of my interviewees volunteered, without prompting 
from me, that it was “the worst experience of my life.” Importantly, three of 
these interviewees had spent time incarcerated in jail or in a juvenile facility, 
and they nevertheless experienced this professional interview as a bad 
experience. Three interviewees were unable to tell me how many people 
were in the room (Sandy: “I guess I just blocked this off my mind. I can’t 




even tell you. It’s just a general sense of people in suits asking you 
questions”). The remaining four accounts are of between four and seven 
people. Mike, who had a background in law enforcement, said: 
Like they teach you in interrogations, to stand on the left side of the person and a 
little bit behind them, because it makes them feel vulnerable? That’s how they 
played it. The [person who chaired the committee] was on my left a bit behind me. 
It was disorienting. 
Gina said: 
It was horrible. It was shameful. I bawled my eyes out. It was awful to explain these 
charges to them. It was all taken out of context. I just cried and cried. Honestly I 
don’t know what came out of my mouth. 
Bree said: 
I can’t even give you the blow by blow because the whole thing was just so… I felt 
so ashamed. I said what I thought they wanted to hear but it all felt fake and I was 
angry and upset…  
Brian, a notable exception, said:  
After everything I’ve been through, this was not a big deal. I’m a felon. I’m used 
to people disrespecting me. I’m used to being treated like nobody. It was just one 
more of those. I said to myself, I have a task to complete here, to persuade these 
people to find a positive finding, and that’s it, then I’m out of here.  
3. “There’s no context”: Sticking to the Court Record 
The bar’s definition of moral character includes “respect for and 
obedience to the law,” which is perhaps not surprising as a gateway to the 
legal profession. When asked about the nexus between moral character and 
criminal records, Martin, the ethics attorney said, “the bar is doing its best 
to make sure that there are no psychopaths in the profession.” When I 
suggested that many managing partners of BigLaw firms (a U.S. industry 
term of art referring to the nation’s largest law firms) might exhibit 
symptoms of psychopathy, my interlocutor laughed, saying: “a criminal 
record is not a perfect predictor of psychopathy. But what else do we have?” 
The assessment of the candidate’s record relies, as a primary source, on 
the official court record and accepts it unquestionably as truth. 
Discrepancies between the court record and the applicant’s disclosure are 
imputed to the applicant’s efforts to cover up unflattering (at best) or 
incriminating (at worst) information about themselves. Several interviewees 
were taken aback when discrepancies between their court records and their 
accounts of the events were interpreted as intentional deception. Typically, 
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when telling me their criminal histories, they provided a very rich context 
to their actions, which shed a strikingly different light on them than the 
official record. Bree told me of a personal relationship that went sour and 
led to emotion-filled retaliation and expressed frustration that her 
indictment for a property felony left much of that context out of the 
conversation. Rasheed mentioned the context for his own property offence, 
which was an innocently meant prank. Gina’s story of her most recent 
entanglement with the law was especially evocative: 
I was at a clinic working on a [human rights case] and we won. It was such a good 
day, and we all went to celebrate, and I had a few glasses of wine. Now, my car was 
parked right there, but obviously it would not be a good idea to drive tipsy, so I 
went to take [the train]. And then it turns out there’s a mechanical problem and 
there’s no trains going anywhere, and how am I going to get home? So maybe I’m 
a little frustrated, and there’s no attendant, and a cop comes along, and starts 
asking questions, and boom, public intoxication. When all I’m trying to do is not 
commit a DUI. 
Bree: If all you read was the criminal record, you wouldn’t know the first thing 
about what happened. It’s such a reductive framework. 
The stories my interviewees told of their crimes are reflective of experiences 
that litigants in general,57 and criminal defendants in particular,58 face when 
the complex genesis of their legal problem is reduced to what the legal 
system deems relevant. My interviewees’ legal education imbued their 
experience as criminal defendants with a sour aftertaste, as they felt the 
reductionist character of the legal system. This contributed to their sense of 
shame and their feelings that aspects of their conduct that could be 
understandable, if not excusable, were left out of the official narrative of the 
crime, and that the richness and uniqueness of their circumstances was 
blurred to make them faceless, unidentifiable members of the criminal 
offender population. 
4. “I’m Sorry, but I Was Wronged, Too”: The Complicated Experience 
of Remorse 
Recall De Giorgi’s formerly incarcerated interlocutors, struggling with 
basic survival problems: a roof over their heads, something to eat, a job — 
any job. One of de Giorgi’s important insights was that, despite the very real 
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problems faced by reentering prisoners, “the main services offered to [them] 
are aimed at restructuring their personalities along the coordinates of an 
idealized neoliberal subject: a self-reliant entrepreneur of the self, constantly 
at work to accumulate human capital and eager to compete with his/her 
peers in the lowest regions of a deregulated labor market.”59 This narrow 
focus on accountability is echoed by de Giorgi’s interlocutors, who “appear 
to have internalized the neoliberal narrative of personal responsibility that 
is constantly inculcated in prisons, rehabilitation centers, and reentry 
programs. They wholeheartedly embrace the dominant rhetoric of free 
choice, as well as hegemonic definitions of social deservingness and 
undeservingness.”60 
As amply demonstrated in Gossage and Glass, expressing remorse and 
convincing the committee of having transformed one’s life are essential. The 
importance of not only feeling remorse, but performing it convincingly, so 
that it is readable to the committee, cannot be understated. I saw parallels 
between this experience and my research on self-presentation of lifers before 
parole boards.61 The expectation of the committee seems to be a complete, 
unqualified expression of remorse, and it has to be read as genuine. 
In I Was Wrong62 and Justice Through Apologies,63 Nick Smith examines 
the components of what is generally perceived as a complete apology, listing 
no less than 13 factors. Some of these address the content of the apology 
(such as corroborated factual record, acceptance of blame, identification of 
the harms done and the moral principles behind them, willingness to 
redress), but some of them address the context and performance of the 
apology, which lend it verisimilitude.  
Smith’s list of factors might appear a tall order, but it speaks to the 
public conversation about whether apologies are “complete” and the 
tendency to reject “non-apology-apologies” a-la “I’m sorry they were hurt.” 
Importantly, Smith’s list addresses not only what is said, but also how it is 
said. In Justice Through Apologies, Smith convincingly argues against the 
practice of court-ordered apologies, which, as he explains, are inherently 
incomplete and unconvincing by virtue of the context in which they are 
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offered. Elsewhere,64 I expand Smith’s point to encompass the expectation 
that remorse be performed at parole hearings, and the moral character 
“informal conference” is no different. Because of this context, in which 
people are expected to deliver a convincing performance of remorse, I asked 
the bar official I interviewed how he could tell whether someone was 
genuine in expressing remorse. My pleasant interlocutor became angry and 
replied: “What do you think, that I just fell off the boat? I was a federal 
prosecutor for 28 years. I can tell when I’m being lied to.” 
My interviewees who, regardless of their diverse socio-economic 
background were, as a group, educated, eloquent, and sophisticated, took 
issue with the simplistic way in which the bar solicited their expressions of 
remorse. By contrast to de Giorgi’s subjects, my subjects did not embrace 
the dominant rhetoric of an unqualified remorse, even as they were keenly 
aware of the need to project it.  
Bree: It’s not that I’m not sorry. I’m sorry. But I was wronged, too. You should 
have seen that courtroom. I walked with a really strong sense that an injustice had 
been done. And there was no room, no space, in that interview, to discuss this. 
This doesn’t negate my remorse, you know what I mean? I can feel sorry for what 
I did and at the same time tell you that I was wronged too. 
The duality that Bree identifies is between her own complex understanding 
of the factors that led to her crime of conviction and the oversimplified, 
unambiguous narrative expected by the court. This theme was echoed more 
explicitly by Jolene and by Gina, both of whom offer their sense that the 
courtroom hearing is performative: 
Jolene: What I did all those years ago and what was done to me is all part of a very 
complicated experience as a young person. And it’s all linked to being a runaway 
and being involved with drugs. So I knew the expectation was, talk about your part 
and leave out all the rest, because that makes it seem like you’re not really sorry. 
Gina: It was very clear to me that I had to grovel. There were no two ways about 
it. There was no one in the room that I felt could take in a complicated narrative 
of what happened. It was obvious that I was in a theater production and I just had 
to follow the script.  
Gina, in particular, evokes Goffman’s notion of a constant performance, a 
“presentation of self,”65 in a setting in which it was very clear to her that the 
performance was inauthentic to the narrative. She also suggests that her 
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complicated history was something the people in the room were unable to 
“take in.” 
Even more bitterness resulted from situations in which my interviewees 
provided a “record of rehabilitation” that was read as inauthentic. Mike 
included in his file evidence of his many volunteer and pro-bono activities. 
He was dismayed when the committee challenged his motivation in 
participating in these activities: 
[The committee member] said, this is all puffery, you’re doing all this stuff to glorify 
yourself and get good connections. A lot of this is politically expedient. That was 
upsetting to hear. Being on these boards is a lot of work. 
Overall, the sense I got was not that my interviewees were not remorseful, 
but that their remorse was entwined with the complex nature of criminal 
justice in America, in which apportioning blame is not as easy as it seems, 
and in which the criminal justice system can only “read” unqualified 
remorse. One interesting subsection of this experience was the issue of 
substance abuse, to which we now turn. 
5. Substance Abuse: Overdiagnosis or Denial? 
The classification used by the bar to sort moral character cases classifies 
substance abuse issues as serious: a single DUI lands an applicant in 
Category 3, whereas two DUI offences land them in Category 4. The bar 
official I interviewed explained: 
We have a serious problem with substance abuse in the legal profession. So our 
job in dealing with these cases is to try and figure out whether the person really 
has a substance abuse problem or they were just unlucky. The two obvious things 
we’re looking at are, do we have a pattern here? Or is this just one incident? And 
how recent is it?  
Three of my interviewees — Brian, Mike, and Gina — participated in recovery 
programs in the legal community. Notably, all three of them denied having 
a substance abuse problem. Brian participated in The Other Bar,66 a 12-step 
organization for the legal community, which is not officially affiliated with 
the California Bar, and explained:  
To be honest, I don’t think I have a substance abuse problem. But I did find the 
program useful. It’s not very common to find a place where men talk about their 
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feelings openly, and because we share a profession, a lot of the dilemmas and the 
things people were talking about were stuff that I, too, deal with in my life.  
Mike and Gina participated in the Lawyer Assistance Program (LAP), which 
is affiliated with the California Bar.67 In both cases, they joined the program 
because at their first informal conference, in which they were denied 
admission to the bar, they were required to do so. LAP defines its mission 
statement as helping “lawyers, State Bar applicants, and law students who 
are grappling with stress, anxiety, depression, substance abuse or concerns 
about their career.” The program is billed as a voluntary, confidential 
resource, but it offers “monitoring” services for a fee: 
The Monitored Lawyer Assistance Program is for attorneys who want to satisfy a 
specific monitoring or verification requirement imposed by an employer, the 
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, State Bar Court, Committee of Bar Examiners 
or another entity. 
The program offers long-term structure and the support of a professional case 
manager. Attorneys may refer themselves to this program or may be referred as the 
result of an investigation or disciplinary proceeding. It is also available to attorneys 
seeking help independently who want the additional structure and support that 
this part of the program provides. There is a fee for group participation and lab 
testing, if required.68 
LAP is a more structured substance-abuse program than The Other Bar, in 
the sense that it provides periodic drug testing, professional supervision, 
and even an assessment. The bar official I interviewed explained that LAP 
provides the Committee with a letter regarding the applicant’s progress in 
their rehabilitation journey. The letter uses terms of art to describe 
rehabilitation, which the committee “decodes” in order to decide whether 
additional time at the program is necessary.  
Mike: I found it a good program, even though I don’t think I actually have a 
substance abuse problem. But it was good to have the structure, because at the first 
hearing they were telling me I was clearly not aware of the problem, that I needed 
to accept the problem to take care of it, so it was good to have something I could 
bring to them that would say, “moderately rehabilitated” or “completely 
rehabilitated” and have them accept it. 
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Gina: Look, I can have a glass of wine. Or several. And stop at will. I’m not an 
alcoholic, obviously. But after the first hearing, it was obvious that the way out of 
this situation was the LAP program. So I participated, and the leader of the 
program became a mentor for me. He wrote me a really nice letter for my second 
hearing.  
For both Mike and Gina, “lumping” them into the substance-abuse-problem 
population was a reduction and generalization of the role alcohol played in 
their lives. They describe a sense of being “roped” into an artificial, 
performative situation, which is the only way to provide the credentials that 
the system is able to recognize.  
I asked Martin whether he thought the proliferation of substance abuse 
diagnoses stemmed from overcautiousness on the part of the bar, or denial 
on the part of the applicants. He opined: 
It’s probably both. You know, I used to be an addict. I know very well what it’s like 
to be in denial of your own problems. And at the same time, if the bar 
overdiagnoses, I can see why they do it. We have a really serious issue of lawyers 
who are irresponsible, falling behind, disappointing their clients, even deceiving 
or cheating their clients, and it’s often linked with substance abuse. Don’t forget 
that there’s also some comorbidity with issues of mental health, which are also rife 
in the legal profession, and because there is so much shame in the profession about 
having a mental health challenge, people simply self-medicate. 
Overcautiousness about sobriety is not unique to the California Bar. Tarra 
Simmons, a formerly incarcerated lawyer, appealed the Washington State 
Review Board’s decision not to approve her moral character application, 
and found some logic in the Board and the Court’s rigidity after the fact: 
I appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. . . It must have surprised both the 
court and the public that the brilliant attorney arguing on my behalf had himself 
been convicted of armed bank robberies just a few years prior. The court reversed 
the Board’s rejection. It embraced evidence-based practices for evaluating how long 
a person must show rehabilitation from substance use disorder and refrain from 
crime before they pose no substantial risk of recidivism. Although the court 
declined to adopt a bright-line rule for admission to practice law, it cited to 
research showing that five years of sobriety and exemplary conduct should be given 
great weight in determining whether a person has transformed her life. The court 
refused to adopt our suggested presumption that five years of law-abiding conduct 
establish the character and fitness necessary to practice law, giving flexibility for 
people with less time of documented desistance or sobriety. In retrospect, I agree 
with the court and view this flexibility as important. Through my personal 
experience mentoring and supporting others in substance use recovery, I 
understand that a relapse can prompt one towards recovery and result in profound 
change. A rigid rule could have mistakenly left out those who are equally 
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committed to overcoming their history of abuse and equally qualified to be 
members of the legal profession.69 
Because of the confidentiality involved, it is impossible to obtain data about 
the demographics and backgrounds of LAP participants. But the problem 
of obtaining data runs far deeper and involves important dimensions such 
as race and class, to which we turn next. 
6. Invisible Diversity: The Intersection of Criminal Histories with Race 
and Class 
Because the bar did not, until recently, keep statistics on its moral 
character process, it is impossible to tell the extent to which being identified 
as a moral character “problem” correlated with race or class.70 But my 
interviewees were painfully aware of the intersections between their 
demographics and their path to the legal profession. Notably, interviewees 
of color connected the moral character process with other aspects of their 
marginalization, both throughout the process and after it. Rasheed 
explained: 
I’ve been sitting in meetings with colleagues and am painfully aware of how I am 
doubly “other”: because of my race and because of this thing that people can’t see. 
And neither of these are things you comment on in polite conversation or make 
overt. 
White interviewees were also deeply aware of race, but rather as an 
exception. Interviewees for whom the criminal justice encounter was an 
aberration in their lives felt like visitors who saw what the system was like 
for disenfranchised individuals. Bree said: 
Look, [the trial] was a bad experience, but I’m keenly aware of the fact that I was 
overall lucky. There was this guy there, and his hearings got delayed, too, and I 
gotta say — I was so lucky that my [family] is [influential]. It could have been a lot 
worse. 
Bree’s comment reflects a keen awareness of the privilege she was able to 
monetize into a lenient outcome in the criminal justice system. I asked Bree 
 
69  Simmons, supra note 2.  
70  This problem is, remarkably, not limited to California. In her personal essay about her 
own Bar admission barrier in Washington State, Tarra Simmons reports that “The 
WSBA does not keep demographic data on the applicants who are admitted or denied, 
and the confidential nature of the process does not allow for them to have access to 
prior Board decisions.” See Simmons, supra note 2. 
 




whether the experience honed her compassion and care toward those hurt 
by the system, and she replied: 
Sure! This is why, why I wanted to practice law, to correct these problems and help 
people. Except I ended up not doing it because I gotta say, after everything I’ve 
been through, I can’t deal with criminal law. Just can’t deal with it. Too 
traumatized.  
Gina spoke of her sense of being “otherized” in invisible ways: 
I’ve had this long history, and people think, just because I wear this white face, 
and I walk around, I’ve made it. 
Q: That’s an interesting metaphor, ‘wearing a white face.’ 
A: Well, that’s exactly what it feels like. Like the white face is a mask. And of course 
it’s different for someone who walks around looking like a person of color. But I 
have had these experiences, and I feel kinship with people who felt them, even 
though this white face is shielding me from overt reactions. But this process made 
me realize even more strongly how people are treated in this country. 
Q: Did this shape your decision to go into public interest lawyering? 
A: No, that happened earlier. I’ve always wanted to do this.  
Gina’s remarkable use of the term “wearing a white face” suggests that the 
identities of white applicants might be more redeemable than those of 
applicants of color. Their ability, to use Goffman’s dramaturgical approach, 
to use their “mask” of a white face to perform an identity that does not 
appear spoiled to outside viewers, is not available to applicants of color, like 
Rasheed, for whom the hidden spoiled identity as a person with a criminal 
record is echoed by the overt spoiled identity of a person of color within a 
predominantly white profession. 
Nonetheless, it is important to say that all my interviewees — white 
people and people of color alike — struck me as having been sensitive to 
issues of discrimination before their legal career, but many of them said that 
their own experiences in the criminal justice system made them keenly 
aware of oppression and inequality. Two white interviewees mentioned 
meeting other defendants in court who fared much worse than they did. 
Gabe explained: 
If anything, my background made me even more aware of what bullshit the war on 
drugs is, and more committed to helping people that are caught in it. 
These sensitivities to race and class were just some of the effects of the moral 
character experience on my interviewee’s legal career after their paths to 
admission were cleared. 
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7. Effect on Legal Career  
All the interviewees, without exception, reported a sense of joy and 
relief in finally being admitted to the bar. 
Gabe: I was waiting to hear… my friends got their letters back, and I was wondering 
what was keeping mine. So when I heard, it was like — my life can begin again. I’m 
done with all that and now I can move on. 
Bree: Just immense relief. I cried when I got the letter.  
Gina: So many people rallied around me for the second hearing. I called in all the 
favors, all my friends rose to the occasion. So when I heard back — tears of joy, and 
I right away planned a giant party for all my friends. It was such a wonderful 
celebration. 
But the embarrassing and shameful aspect of the experience remained 
etched in their memories and affected the way they conducted themselves 
in their professional lives. Three of my interviewees spoke to me early in the 
morning, before their colleagues came in; the rest spoke to me in the 
evenings, at home or in cafés. Mike explained his discretion policy: 
My direct supervisor at work knows, and he also went to bat for me with the 
committee, writing letters and all that. But the other people who work here don’t 
really. Which is fine, not everyone needs to know everything. 
Bree, too, erred on the side of non-disclosure to her colleagues: 
I’ve certainly become more reserved. The other associates at the firm are going out 
to drinks and inviting me, and I’m more hesitant about this than I’d been in other 
workplaces. Nobody here knows about me. 
Other interviewees had a different approach, relying on their experiences as 
a way to build bridges with their clients. Gabe, who works as a public 
defender, explained: 
Oh, I openly share this with clients. It’s sometimes hard for clients to find common 
ground with a defense attorney, and they understandably think you don’t know 
what they’re going through. I’m after all a white guy, wearing this suit, my tattoos 
are covered, so telling them, yes, I know what it’s like to be in jail for the night, I 
know what it’s like to go through this and fight the war on drugs, it’s important. 
It humanizes them. It reminds them that I see that they are human. 
Martin, who represents bar applicants and lawyers in ethics matters, shared: 
My [history of addiction] is something that I always share with applicants. It’s an 
important ice breaker, and also a good reminder that you can go through this and 
move on to a successful legal career.  
And for many of them, the concern about being found out never completely 
vanished. Rasheed described this sense of constant vigilance: 




It’s something that can never truly recede to the back of my mind. Yes, I still 
Google myself to make sure that whatever’s there stays off of Page 1. I do this 
periodically. I have a great job and I’m happy, but I’m never going to not Google 
myself to make sure. 
He remembered an instance in which his personal history stood in the way 
of getting a job: 
I had an interview at [workplace] scheduled, and everyone was so very nice and 
sending me emails in anticipation of this [interview], and then, a few days before 
the interview, I Googled myself and found that mention of the incident I was 
involved with jumped to Page 1.  
Q: Which you ascribed to… 
A: Which I ascribed to people looking me up. And a couple of days later, I got an 
email from them saying that they’ve decided to go a different direction with their 
hires, and that was that. I knew what it was about.  
Q: Did they ever tell you it was because of your record? 
A: They didn’t have to. 
Rasheed also reflected on how his criminal history impacted his personal 
life: 
Another interesting situation is how this has affected dating. But you know, in a 
funny way this actually does an excellent job of weeding people for me. Whoever 
might have a problem with my history, or with dating someone with a criminal 
record, is not someone I want to date anyway. 
This diversity of opinion about the interviewees’ later careers reveals 
different personal styles and ways to express and foster resilience. But 
regardless of how open interviewees were with the people in their 
professional lives about what they went through, their backgrounds, and the 
way these backgrounds played out in the moral character process, could not 
be forgotten. These lasting effects on the interviewees’ psyches are striking 
given the insights from life course criminology about desistance: certain 
events in the life course — particularly those that imbue a person with 
considerable stigma — can leave a strong and lingering imprint on the 
person’s life even as the person makes the choice to desist in the future. 
IV. DISCUSSION: SHAME, REMORSE, AND EXCLUSION  
The most dominant emotion that arose in the interviews was shame, in 
a way that complicates the existing literature on re-entry. Perhaps by contrast 
to the simplistic assumption that anyone whose needs are located higher 
than bare survival in Maslow’s hierarchy is privileged, and thus has problems 
that merit less attention, my interviewees’ experiences reflected a unique 
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type of suffering: the shame associated with the sudden, and compelled, 
bridging of the gap between who they were and who they had become. The 
shame was exacerbated by the discrepancy between my interviewees’ past 
experiences and the stereotypes and expectations associated with people of 
their new professional milieu. Echoing Goffman’s concept of 
performativity, the interviewees, most of whom had managed to morph 
their self-identity to conform to their new status as candidates for the legal 
profession, were reduced by the process into their former shoes as convicts 
and/or prisoners.  
Making sense of these sentiments illuminates previously neglected 
themes in the re-entry literature, namely the costs of upward mobilization 
from a checkered past. A process that requires disclosure and discussion of 
people’s histories, even if done in a respectful and courteous way, can and 
does bring up difficult experiences. Ironically, the social distance traveled 
from these experiences to seeking admission to an elite profession makes 
the former status less normal, more aberrant, and more emotionally difficult 
to face and disclose. The stringent requirements on accuracy in disclosure 
should be interpreted in light of these emotional difficulties and should take 
into account not only the practical difficulties of remembering and 
accurately recreating an unsettled life, but also the anguish involved in 
completing the paperwork. Omissions and inaccuracies should not be 
ignored, but they should be approached with nuance and sensitivity. 
But there are also ways in which the process itself can be made more 
salutary. Allowing attendees to bring support people to the hearings and 
allowing those to speak on the applicants’ behalf could help transform a 
difficult situation into a more healing one. Opening the process to law 
school professors and fellow students would do the same and contribute to 
the reduction of stigma. 
One of the striking findings was the contrast between the Bar officials’ 
simplistic perception of remorse and the applicants’ more complex 
perception of their personal histories and moral process. The officials’ 
certainty that they could glean the essence of the story from the court record 
and to assess remorse reflected a considerable amount of unwarranted 
hubris. My interlocutor’s certainty that he can detect true remorse is far 
from endemic to bar proceedings: police officers, judges, parole 
commissioners and parole agents all tend to highly estimate their ability to 
detect sincerity. Experimental research, however, does not bear this out. In 
one experiment, Saul Kassin et al. surveyed 574 investigators from 16 police 




departments in five American states and 57 customs officials from two 
Canadian provinces.71 The subjects were asked to rate their own deception 
detection skills and estimated a 77% level of accuracy. This high level of 
confidence far surpasses experimental findings. Elsewhere, Meissner and 
Kassin reviewed literature on police officers’ accuracy in detection and 
found it to be no different than that of laypeople.72 In a third study, Kassin 
et al. played ten taped confessions of inmates to college students and police 
investigators, half of which were true and half false. The students were 
generally more accurate than police, and accuracy rates were higher among 
those presented with audiotaped than videotaped confessions. In addition, 
investigators were significantly more confident in their judgments and also 
prone to judge confessors guilty. To determine if police accuracy would 
increase if this guilty response bias were neutralized, participants in a second 
experiment were specifically informed that half the confessions were true 
and half were false. This manipulation eliminated the investigator response 
bias, but it did not increase accuracy or lower confidence.73 Even 
psychologist Paul Ekman, who believes that facial microexpressions can 
reveal insincerity,74 finds that lie detection rates among untrained 
professionals — lawyers, trained law enforcement professionals, 
psychotherapists, trial attorneys, and judges — tend to be no better than 
chance.75 
These difficulties are especially salient in the context of assessing the 
sincerity of remorse. In his book Showing Remorse,76 Richard Weisman 
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discusses two kinds of people whose remorse would not be recognized by 
the legal system despite their sincerity: the innocent defendant and the 
defendant who believes that his or her actions were right. Neither of these 
people can genuinely express remorse in a satisfying way, because the 
building blocks of the apology will be perceived as lacking. Notably, in the 
context of the moral character hearing, as well as in the context of a criminal 
trial or a parole hearing, convicted defendants are regarded as factually as 
well as legally guilty. Nonetheless, some of them profess their innocence. 
Formally, sentencing judges and parole commissioners are not supposed to 
hold the lack of expressed remorse against people who contest their guilt; 
practically, however, the extent to which the person is seen as stubbornly 
avoiding accountability and exhibiting lack of insight, as opposed to 
courageously fighting to prove their innocence, largely depends on whether 
the person is perceived as guilty or as innocent. 
Although the assessment of remorse as genuine is regarded as an 
important task in the criminal justice system, as Susan Bandes argues,77 
there is currently no credible empirical evidence that remorse can be 
accurately evaluated in a courtroom (or, for that matter, anywhere else 
where virtual strangers’ credibility is assessed). Without any empirical 
validity, factfinders rely on their sense of a convincing remorse performance. 
This adds a thick layer of artifice and superficiality to a process that 
purportedly demands serious self-reflection. A strongly recurring theme in 
the interviews was the interviewees’ sense that their expressions of remorse, 
participation in rehabilitative programming (particularly substance abuse 
programs) and preparations for subsequent hearings were all part of a 
performance — not so much a disingenuous one as an artificial one. Again, 
echoing Goffman, the interviewees were forced to reduce their complex 
experiences and reflections to a flat narrative that could be comprehended 
by the committee, causing distress and dissonance in these intelligent, 
articulate people, who found themselves playing a mediocre part in a cliché 
play. 
Even worse, the inability to accurately detect genuine remorse can yield 
further injustices by creating racial and cultural inequality: the evidence 
suggests that that race and other impermissible factors can confound the 
ability to evaluate remorse. In The Cultural Defense, Alison Renteln reminds 
us that not everyone displays remorse in the same way. Among her examples 
is the criminal trial of a young Hmong man, in which on appeal the defense 
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argued that the jury drew the wrong conclusions from the defendant’s 
defiant and unemotional demeanor. Factors such as these could play to the 
disadvantage of applicants of color at moral character hearings.78  
Indeed, this is just one of several issues that raise alarm about the 
demographic effects of professional exclusion from the Bar. The comments 
by interviewees of color about their double deviance, and by white 
interviewees about their hidden deviance, underscored the deep and 
scarring impact of an elitist profession on people with unique, non-elitist 
personal experiences. The California bar is disproportionately male and 
white. In the few occasions in which bar membership with criminal records 
are discussed, it is not in the context of diversity, but rather in the context 
of a public concern about “crooks” in the legal profession. Accordingly, the 
bar orients its policies, including the recent requirement that current 
members undergo periodic fingerprinting, toward the exposure and 
weeding out of “crooks.” Criminal experiences are seen as a liability and a 
warning sign about the members’ character. 
My interviewees’ interpretations were diametrically opposed to those of 
the bar. All of them, without exception, mentioned their experiences in the 
criminal justice system as catalysts for their decision to become lawyers, and 
most specifically to help disenfranchised population. Public interest lawyers 
who spoke to me cited their own criminal experience as an important 
empathy booster with their clients. Even some of the ethics attorneys cited 
their personal experiences with substance abuse as a bridge between them 
and clients with similar histories. By contrast, commercial lawyers, especially 
in big firms, remained circumspect about their history. Two lawyers spoke 
to me in the early morning hours, when they were alone in the office, and 
others spoke from home, citing concern about letting their colleagues know 
about their history. My conclusion from this was that the interviewees’ 
background was a rich resource that provided them with a unique and 
important insider perspective on the system, which remained unvalued and 
tagged as uniformly negative baggage.  
This limited perception of the interviewees’ background matters 
because criminal histories are, in themselves, an important form of diversity 
that remains invisible in the world of limited, prescribed categories of 
diversity consisting of race, gender and sometimes sexual orientation. The 
truths revealed about workplace diversity by the existing categories are 
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important, but they obscure other truths, involving other categories of 
valuable viewpoints from less overt personal histories and characteristics. 
Rather than seeing my interviewees as valuable resources for the legal 
profession, they are viewed as liabilities, people to scrutinize and screen, to 
the profession’s detriment. 
Also, importantly, having a criminal record intersects in meaningful 
ways with other personal characteristics, such as race and class. 
Demographic research robustly shows how poor people and people of color 
are over-represented in the criminal justice system, though the interplay of 
race and class can be difficult to untangle. We know that these same 
populations tend to be underrepresented in the Law student population; 
what we don’t know is how many people of color, who might have otherwise 
been interested in pursuing legal careers, refrain from applying because of 
concerns that their criminal record will be an obstacle in admission to the 
school or, later, to the bar. Because, until recently, the bar did not collect 
statistics on its own moral character process, we also do not know whether 
the applicants that the bar selects for further moral character proceedings 
(expanded written answers, informal conference) tend to be 
disproportionately poor people of color. This raises concerns about the 
contribution of the moral character process to the elitist composition of the 
bar, either as a weeding implement or as a deterrent, whose scope can only 
be determined with the data. The fact that data has not been collected until 
recently is in itself suggestive that the bar did not prioritize transparency 
about its member selection process. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
My interviewees’ comments about remorse suggest that the bar’s goal to 
“weed out psychopaths,” as suggested by one of my interviewees, is pursued 
with a healthy dose of hubris. This is, of course, not unique to the legal 
profession. Strewn throughout the criminal process are situations in which 
professionals — jurors, judges, police officers, parole commissioners — 
purport to be able to determine the sincerity of remorse. Scholarship about 
remorse shows that professionals tend to significantly overestimate their 
ability to discern sincerity in remorse. As Susan Bandes argues,79 there is no 
dependable way to detect remorse, and even to the extent that it correlates 
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with rehabilitation or desistance — which is in itself contested — its sincerity 
is unknowable. 
As a consequence, my first suggestion is for more modesty in the bar’s 
approach. In the absence of reliable information about internal 
transformation, the bar should adopt a guideline that “rehabilitation is as 
rehabilitation does.” Gainfully employed people, students in good standing, 
and the like, are people who desist from crime. 
In this context, it is remarkable that the bar does not consider law 
school itself an experience demonstrative of desistance. Life course 
criminology literature, as well as the desistance literature, highlight 
education as an important station on the path to desistance. The rigor and 
stress involved in legal education imply that those who undertake law school 
are making a considerable effort that guides and colors their lives and can 
be, if not all-consuming, nearly so. This is especially remarkable given the 
fact that the bar views very seriously any violations of the law school honor 
code, classifying them as “category 4” incidents.  
Tarra Simmons’ experience appealing her denial offers a glimpse into 
the difficulty of making such arguments as an individual. The considerable 
amount of shame involved in applying to the Bar with a criminal record 
means that people usually pursue these legal paths on their own and cannot 
therefore benefit from the collective experience of others in the same 
category. This lamentable situation might change, however, with two 
laudable developments. Underground Scholars, an organization for justice-
involved university students at Berkeley and UCLA, sees its mission as 
“creat[ing] a pathway for formerly incarcerated and system impacted 
individuals into higher education” and “building a prison-to-university 
pipeline through recruitment, retention, and advocacy.”80 While 
Underground Scholars focuses mostly on recruitment and retention in 
undergraduate programs, their important work could mean more access to 
law school by college graduates with criminal records. A more direct 
contribution to the ability to advocate as a group is the recent effort by 
Dieter Tejada, a Vanderbilt Law School graduate who passed the bar in 
Connecticut but failed the moral character qualification, to form the 
National Justice Impact Movement, a voluntary bar association bar for 
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formerly incarcerated lawyers.81 Such an organization, particularly if 
adopted by other states, could have a valuable contribution to reducing 
negative stigmas, providing positive role models, and infusing the legal 
community with insider perspectives, compassion, and a deeper 
comprehension of the criminal justice experience. 
Finally, law schools themselves share a responsibility to support 
students with criminal records and help them succeed. Law school 
applications should be explicit and clear about the fact that their content is 
read by the bar committee in tandem with the moral character application, 
and that accuracy in the narrative is therefore imperative even at this early 
stage. Law schools should provide online information about criminal 
records and the moral character process on their website. Admissions 
personnel should be able to offer counsel to prospective applicants with 
professionalism and compassion about the content of the applications, to 
make sure that the threshold to entry is not a deterrent or hindrance, but 
rather a challenge to undertake with full information and resources.  
Politically speaking, California law schools have invested plenty of 
advocacy and activism energy on a struggle to raise the minimum score for 
California bar passage, which is the lowest nationwide.82 I think it would be 
morally advisable to divert at least some of this energy to the issue of moral 
character. To the extent that legal education is a major player in shaping the 
legal profession of the future, law schools should expand their definition of 
“diversity” beyond well-trodden paths and advocate for their graduates with 
criminal records, whose intimate acquaintance with the criminal process 
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